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I.  INTRODUCTION 
IN recent years in the United States,  government regulation of the hous- 
ing industry has increased  dramatically.  During the late  1960s and early 
1970s,  many  communities  became  increasingly  dissatisfied  with  the  ef- 
fects of rapid, unregulated suburban growth on the overall quality of life. 
This  increased  awareness  of  the  environmental,  social,  and  economic 
effects of new residential development  led to a widespread proliferation of 
land-use and environmental  regulations.  While this growth of regulation 
has proceeded  at all levels  of government,  the bulk of control over resi- 
dential  development  remains  in  the  hands  of  local  governments.  This 
increase in land-use controls means that the home-building industry has to 
work  within  a much  more  complex  and often  costly  regulatory frame- 
work. 
Local  governments  use  a wide  variety  of  procedures  to  control  the 
location,  timing, character, and amount of residential development.  Tra- 
ditionally,  communities  have  relied  on  zoning  and  subdivision  ordi- 
nances,  building codes,  and communitywide  land-use plans as the major 
tools for the regulation of new development.  In recent years, more sophis- 
ticated  and  complex  regulatory  procedures  have  been  developed  and 
utilized widely  by municipalities.  In many communities,  traditional land- 
use  controls  have  been  augmented  by  environmental  and fiscal  effect 
procedures,  urban growth management systems,  utility connection  mora- 
*  We thank Dennis  Carlton and an anonymous  referee for their helpful comments  and 
Eric Zivot for able research assistance.  This research was supported in part by the Center 
for Real Estate  and Urban Economics  at the University  of California, Berkeley. 
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toria, multiple-permit systems,  overall growth limitations, or a combina- 
tion of those  measures. 
The traditional, asserted purpose of land-use controls is to promote the 
health, safety,  and general welfare of residents of a community.  Increas- 
ingly  stringent  land-use  regulations  and  growth  controls  have  been 
justified in terms of improved environmental quality and the maintenance 
of  "community  character."  Yet  there  is  a growing  recognition  that in 
many communities  land-use  regulations  may serve  to  maintain housing 
costs  at a level  high enough to prevent moderate- or low-income  families 
from purchasing housing. The apparent effect of the new trend in land-use 
regulation appears to have been  substantial increases  in the cost  of new 
housing production and subsequent  increases in the prices of all housing. 
Land-use and environmental regulations can have important effects  on 
almost  every  component  of housing  costs.  Regulations  that restrict the 
supply of land for development,  impose  a minimum lot size,  or restrain 
the permissible  level  of  residential  development  density  can greatly in- 
crease  raw land costs.  Regulations  concerning improvements,  the provi- 
sion of amenities,  and subdivision design can add significantly to the cost 
of lot preparation and land development.  The costs  of structural material 
and labor can be increased  by building codes  and other regulations that 
designate minimum house  size or require major changes in house design. 
Substantial carrying costs  can be imposed  by administrative delays  and 
by  the  often  lengthy  intervals  required to  gain development  approval. 
Regulatory compliance  can also  affect various administrative,  engineer- 
ing, and planning costs.  Dowall'  suggests that land-use controls may have 
another  inflationary effect-creating  barriers to  entry,  which  facilitate 
monopoly power in the housing industry. Dowall and especially  Frieden2 
note that development  restrictions  may lead developers  to reorient their 
projects to higher-income customers  as cost increases force them to build 
more expensive  dwelling units. 
In this paper we  examine  the effects  of local  land-use regulations on 
house  prices  in the San Francisco  Bay Area.3 The research is primarily 
empirical,  although  we  present  a  brief  discussion  of  theoretical  and 
econometric  issues. 
1 David E. Dowall,  The Effect of Land Use  and Environmental Regulations on Housing 
Costs,  8 Pol'y  Stud. J. 277 (1979). 
2  Bernard J. Frieden, The New Regulation Comes to Suburbia, 55 Pub. Interest 15 (1979). 
3 A  discussion  of  the  evolution  and  nature  of  local  land-use  controls  and  growth- 
management programs in the San Francisco Bay Area may be found in Kenneth T. Rosen & 
Lawrence Katz, Growth Management and Land Use Controls: The San Francisco Bay Area 
Experience,  9 J. Am.  Real Est.  & Urb. Econ.  A.  321 (1981). 
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II.  THE  INTERJURISDICTIONAL  EFFECTS OF LOCAL LAND-USE 
CONTROLS ON HOUSING  PRICES 
A potentially important effect  of local land-use controls on the housing 
market of a metropolitan area is to reduce the supply below  and to raise 
prices above what would prevail in competitive  equilibrium with no land- 
use restrictions.  A number of theoretical models,  such as those presented 
in Courant,4 Rubinfeld,5 and Hamilton,6 demonstrate  that, in both open 
and closed  market areas, zoning restrictions for any defined metropolitan 
area are likely to increase house prices throughout that area. The issue of 
the interjurisdictional effects  of local land-use policies  on housing prices 
within a given urban area has not, however,  been addressed as thoroughly 
in the literature. The basic issue here is whether ajurisdiction that is small 
relative to the metropolitan area, by the use of development  restrictions, 
will raise  its  house  prices  relative  to those  prevailing in the rest of the 
metropolitan area. This interjurisdictional effect depends on the degree of 
substitutability  among  the  housing  stocks  of  different  municipalities 
within an urban area and on the effect  of land-use policies  both on the 
labor market and on neighborhood  amenities. 
At one extreme,  the population of a metropolitan area may be perfectly 
mobile across municipalities.  This means that individual jurisdictions  are 
perfect  competitors  in the production  of  housing  services.  This implies 
that houses  with equivalent  characteristics  and amenity values located in 
different jurisdictions  will be perfect substitutes.  Following Courant,7 as- 
sume that all consumers  in the metropolitan area are identical and have 
the same income.  This implies that the price of housing at each amenity 
level (amenities being public services,  access  to work, and so on) must be 
the same for all jurisdictions  in the metropolitan area to be in equilibrium. 
In this  extreme  case,  local  land-use  policies  can  have  no  interjurisdic- 
tional effect on the price of a house with a given amenity package. Local 
policies  can change housing prices among municipalities only by altering 
amenity values.  Yet  a major effect  of density  controls,  large-lot zoning, 
and growth restrictions may be to improve amenities.  For example,  these 
policies  may yield  more open  space  and reduce both noise  and conges- 
tion. 
4 Paul N. Courant, On the Effect of Fiscal Zoning on Land and Housing Values,  3 J. Urb. 
Econ.  88 (1976). 
5  Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Suburban Employment and Zoning: A General Equilibrium Analy- 
sis,  18 J. Regional  Sci.  33 (1978). 
6  Bruce W. Hamilton,  Zoning and the Exercise  of Monopoly  Power, 5 J. Urb. Econ.  116 
(1978). 
7  See  note 4 supra. 
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Rubinfeld8  has studied  the dynamics  of housing  prices  and  their  interac- 
tion with labor markets, using a model that includes a central business 
district and a suburban  business district, part of which is in a zoned 
residential  area. The regulation  used in his model is large-lot  zoning that 
constrains  the allowable  capital-to-land  ratio and so affects both housing 
production  and  housing  prices in a given suburban  jurisdiction.  In an open 
metropolitan  area, suburban  zoning regulations  increase housing prices 
equally  throughout  the metropolis  and have no interjurisdictional  effects. 
In a closed metropolitan  area, the suburban  zoning regulation  forces a 
lower supply of new housing in that area. As a result, individuals  are 
forced to find housing in unzoned suburban  areas or in the center city. 
Rubinfeld  hypothesizes that this shift in housing results in employment 
falling  in the zoned suburban  business area. This leads then to an increase 
in wages in the zoned area since the marginal  product  of labor  rises. For 
all individuals  in the metropolitan  area to be in locational equilibrium, 
housing prices must rise in the zoned jurisdiction. The housing price 
increase has an ambiguous  effect on center-city housing prices. The in- 
teractive effects of zoning on the labor and housing  markets  result in an 
interjurisdictional  price effect even with identical individuals  and per- 
fectly substitutable  housing. This hypothetical  result-interjurisdictional 
price changes caused by zoning and other land-use  restrictions-can  be 
investigated  empirically. 
Furthermore,  the existence of important  information  and transaction 
and mobility  costs suggests that housing  in different  municipalities  within 
a metropolitan  area the size of the San Francisco Bay Area will not be 
perfectly substitutable.  Market  frictions may prevent the prices of hous- 
ing units of equivalent  quality  located in different  parts  of a metropolitan 
area  from being bid into strict equality. In this case, land-use  restrictions 
in the zoned  jurisdiction  can raise the price of housing  in that  jurisdiction 
relative  to the prices in the rest of the metropolitan  area  as described  by a 
partial  equilibrium  analysis. (See Rosen and Katz9 for further  elabora- 
tion.) Following  from the above theoretical  presentation,  we turn  now to 
our empirical  analysis. 
III.  AN  ECONOMETRIC  ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF GROWTH CONTROLS 
IN THE SAN  FRANCISCO METROPOLITAN  AREA 
The interjurisdictional  effect of land-use  and  growth  controls  in the San 
Francisco Bay Area is analyzed within the context of a cross-sectional 
8 See note 5 supra. 
9 See note 3 supra. 
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hedonic house price model. The sample analyzed consists  of 1,673 single- 
family dwelling  units from sixty-three  suburban communities  within the 
San Francisco  metropolitan area. The data are based on records of house 
sales obtained from the Society  of Real Estate Appraisers (SREA) for the 
period January-June  1979. The SREA data base provided information on 
sales price,  size,  and a number of other structural characteristics  of the 
individual houses  sold in the sample time period.  Community-level  data 
on journey  to  work  were  obtained  from  the  Bay  Area's  Metropolitan 
Transportation  Commission,  and  community  mean  property  tax  rates, 
local government expenditures,  and population density were provided by 
various  county  and state  agencies.  Finally,  the  key  information on the 
specific growth-management policies  of individual communities were de- 
rived from an extensive  mail and telephone land-use policy survey of local 
officials undertaken by the Center for Real Estate and Urban Economics 
at the University  of California, Berkeley.10 
The basic hedonic  price model analyzed hypothesizes  that the price of 
an individual house is a function of its structural characteristics, neighbor- 
hood characteristics,  local fiscal characteristics,  and the land-use and/or 
growth-management policies  of the jurisdiction in which it is located.  Our 
empirical analysis  focuses  on the effects  of formal growth-management 
programs. The land-use variable utilized is DLU,  a dummy variable that 
takes on the value of one for housing units located within jurisdictions for 
which  a formal growth-management  plan had been  in effect  for at least 
one  year  in the  1973-79  period.  A  formal growth-management  plan is 
defined for the purposes  of this study as an explicit  numerical limitation 
on the number of building permits issued  within a jurisdiction or a com- 
plete  moratorium on the issuance  of  new  building permits covering  the 
majority of the community. 
The  definitions  of  the  variables  utilized  in the  empirical analysis  are 
found in Table 1. The means and standard deviations of the variables also 
appear in Table  1. Approximately  10.5 percent of the sample consists  of 
units located  in jurisdictions  with formal growth-management  controls. 
Differences  in the sample means for the characteristics of houses located 
in the formally controlled  and uncontrolled growth subsamples are high- 
lighted in Table  2. Dwelling  units in controlled  communities  are on the 
average  a bit  larger,  more  likely  to  be  located  in the  North  Bay,  and 
somewhat more likely to possess  a pool and/or a view. Although the mean 
characteristics  for  the  controlled  and  uncontrolled  subsamples  do  not 
10 For a detailed analysis of the results of this survey, see Stuart Gabriel, Lawrence Katz, 
& Jennifer Wolch,  Local  Land-Use  Regulation and Proposition  13, Taxing & Spending 73 
(Spring 1980). 
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TABLE  1 
VARIABLE  DEFINITIONS,  MEANS,  AND  STANDARD  DEVIATIONS  OF  THE  DATA  (N  =  1,673) 
Variable  Description*  Mean 
HP  House  sales price (in dollars)  93,342 
(54,114) 
DLU  Equals one if jurisdiction  in which unit is located  had 
formal growth-management program in existence  for at 
least one  year,  1973-79  .105 
SQFT  Square footage  of living space of the house  1,514 
(554) 
BATH  Number of bathrooms  1.88 
(.695) 
POOL  Equals one if pool present  .056 
VIEW  Equals one if significant view  present as designated by 
reporting real estate  broker  .142 
PTAX  Community mean property tax rate of jurisdiction  in 
which unit is locatedt  4.875 
(.521) 
TRANS  Commute time to downtown  San Francisco  (in minutes)  36.677 
(14.101) 
AGE  Age in years of the unit  22.269 
(18.908) 
FRPLC  Number of fireplaces  .877 
(.507) 
TEXP  Per capita local government  (municipal) expenditures  of 
jurisdiction  in which unit is located  (in dollars)  247.43 
(118.66) 
DENSITY  Population density  (per square mile) of jurisdiction  in 
which unit is located  3,686 
(2,165) 
EBAY  Equals one if unit is located  in East Bay (Alameda or 
Contra Costa counties)  .498 
NBAY  Equals one if unit is located  in North Bay (Marin, Napa, 
Solano,  or Sonoma  counties)  .258 
NOTE.-Numbers  in parentheses  are standard  deviations. 
* Dichotomous  variables  equal  zero otherwise. 
t  The property  tax rate applied  to assessed value. 
appear extremely  different in many dimensions,  the difference  in mean 
house  price  is greater than $16,000,  with the controlled  sector  showing 
higher prices.  The issue that our econometric  work centers on is whether 
this house  price differential may be explained  by the observable  differ- 
ences  in structural, fiscal,  and neighborhood characteristics. 
The  first approach  to  the  analysis  of  the  potential  effect  of  growth 
controls on house prices is the estimation of a hedonic house price equa- 
tion of the form 
log(HP)  =  X,8 +  aDLU  +  E, 
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TABLE  2 
MEANS  OF GROWTH-CONTROLLED  AND  -UNCONTROLLED  SUBSAMPLES 
Controlled 
Subsample 
(DLU  =  1) 
108,725 
(55,701) 
1,569 
(501) 
1.960 
(.637) 
.091 
.171 
5.023 
(.602) 
40.910 
(11.360) 
21.634 
(17.696) 
.891 
(.497) 
222.29 
(81.07) 
3,143 
(760) 
.406 
.554 
175 
Uncontrolled 
Subsample 
(DLU  =  0) 
91,549 
(53,658) 
1,507 
(560) 
1.870 
(.701) 
.051 
.139 
4.858 
(.509) 
36.182 
(14.309) 
22.343 
(19.048) 
.876 
(.508) 
250.37 
(121.99) 
3,750 
(2,265) 
.509 
.223 
1,498 
NOTE.-Numbers  in parentheses  are standard  deviations. 
where X represents  a vector  of structural, neighborhood,  and fiscal char- 
acteristics;  p  is  a  vector  of  parameters;  a  is  a  parameter; and  E is  a 
stochastic  term representing unmeasured factors that affect house prices. 
The variables included in the specification are those listed in Table 1; also 
listed  are quadratic terms  for  square footage  and age.  It is hoped  that 
community-cluster  dummy variables (East  Bay and North Bay with the 
Peninsula as the base group) and the population density variable capture 
major differences  in  environments,  amenities,  and  nonresidential  land 
use. 
One potential problem in the estimation  of this equation at the individ- 
ual house  sales  transactions  level  is  that data are not  available  on  the 
property tax rate or the accessibility  to San Francisco  of each individual 
unit. Thus community  means are used for these  two variables.  This is a 
potential  errors-in-variables problem arising from measurement  error in 
these  independent  variables.  However,  since the variations within juris- 
Variable 
HP 
SQFT 
BATH 
POOL 
VIEW 
PTAX 
TRANS 
AGE 
FRPLC 
TEXP 
DENSITY 
EBAY 
NBAY 
N 
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dictions in the sample of both property tax rates and access  times to San 
Francisco  are quite  small  (especially  relative  to  the  variation between 
community means),  it is unlikely that this measurement problem will sig- 
nificantly alter the parameter estimates. 
The first column of Table 3 presents the estimates of equation (1). Most 
of the basic variables are highly significant and are in the predicted direc- 
tions,  with  reasonable  magnitudes.  The  equation  in our model  also  is 
successful  in explaining much of the variation within this cross  section. 
The estimated log housing price differential for houses  in controlled ver- 
sus  uncontrolled  jurisdictions  (defined  as  log(HPc)  -  log(HPu),  where 
HPc is the growth-controlled  house price and HPu is the house price in the 
uncontrolled regime) is .173 with a t-statistic of 9.44. The prices of houses 
in  the  formally  growth-managed  sector  appear to  be  both  statistically 
significant  and  substantially  higher  than  the  prices  of  observationally 
equivalent  houses  in the uncontrolled  sector. 
Still,  the  single-equation  approach with  a  single growth-management 
dummy  variable  suffers  from  the  defect  of  explicitly  constraining  the 
housing price effect of growth controls to be the same for all houses.  This 
is a problem because  growth controls are likely to affect certain types of 
units much more directly than others.  For example,  growth-management 
programs  typically  provide  more  constraint  on  the  development  of 
smaller,  moderate-quality  units  than  on  larger, high-quality units.  The 
potential  market  reorientation  and  the  market  segmentation  effects  of 
formal controls mean that the implicit prices attached to specific housing 
characteristics are likely to diverge across the controlled and uncontrolled 
market segments.  The housing  price differential associated  with growth 
controls  is likely  to  vary for houses  with different characteristics.  This 
suggests that the single-equation approach may yield somewhat distorted 
results. 
This problem can be handled by estimating separate growth-controlled 
and -uncontrolled  sector house  price equations of the form 
log(HPc)  =  a,  +  XIfc +  ,  (2) 
log(HP,)  =  au  +  X,,  +  E,. 
The results of the estimation of separate equations for the two sectors are 
shown in columns  2 and 3 of Table 3. The constant is much larger in the 
controlled  sector  equation,  and the coefficients  on the  structural house 
characteristics'  variables  tend  to  be  greater in the uncontrolled  sector. 
The positive  effect  of growth management on house prices appears to be 
greater for smaller houses,  houses  with a view,  houses  in the Peninsula 
(South  Bay),  and houses  located  closer  to the  central business  district. 
The test  of the equality of all the coefficients  except  the constant  terms 
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TABLE  3 
ESTIMATES  OF ORDINARY  LEAST  SQUARES  HOUSE  PRICE  EQUATIONS 
log(HP)  log(HP,)  log(HP,) 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
.1730 
(.018) 
.00063 
(.00004) 
.025 
(.013) 
.149 
(.024) 
.147 
(.007) 
-.087 
(.016) 
-.0052 
(.0006) 
-.00018 
(.00096) 
.088 
(.012) 
-.00031 
(.00005) 
-.000017 
(.000003) 
-.142 
(.019) 
-.124 
(.020) 
-.0000007 
(.000012) 
-.00000004 
(.00000001) 
11.164 
(.091) 
.750 
.216 
1,673 
.00064 
(.00015) 
-.015 
(.033) 
.149 
(.047) 
.178 
(.042) 
-.133 
(.061) 
-.0168 
(.003) 
-.0080 
(.0027) 
.065 
(.032) 
.00023 
(.00029) 
.000024 
(.00005) 
-.413 
(.121) 
-.509 
(.108) 
.000095 
(.00003) 
-.00000008 
(.00000004) 
12.403 
(.328) 
.852 
.168 
175 
.00063 
(.00005) 
.031 
(.014) 
.157 
(.026) 
.127 
(.018) 
-.071 
(.017) 
-.0028 
(.0007) 
.00051 
(.001) 
.087 
(.013) 
-.00027 
(.00005) 
-.000009 
(.000003) 
-.162 
(.020) 
-.188 
(.023) 
-.000013 
(.000013) 
-.00000003 
(.00000001) 
10.971 
(.097) 
.750 
.214 
1,498 
NOTE.-Numbers  in parentheses  are standard errors. 
across  the  two  equations  (Ho:  ,c =  Ju)  yields  a  test  statistic  that  is 
distributed F(14,  1,643) and that takes on the value 7.51. This hypothesis 
can be  rejected  at any  reasonable  significance  level.  In conclusion,  the 
growth-management  differential  varies  significantly  across  houses  with 
different characteristics. 
Table 4 reports predicted log house  price differentials for a number of 
house  types.  These  predicted  differentials  use  the coefficient  estimates 
reported in columns  2 and 3 of Table 3. The log differential at the sample 
means is  .360. This is substantially larger than the estimated differential 
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DLU 
SQFT 
BATH 
POOL 
VIEW 
PTAX 
TRANS 
AGE 
FRPLC 
TEXP 
DENSITY 
EBAY 
NBAY 
AGE2 
SQFT2 
Constant 
R2 
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TABLE  4 
PREDICTED  HOUSE PRICE  DIFFERENTIALS 
House  Description  log(HPc)  -  log(HP,) 
Sample means  .360 
Controlled subsample  (DLU  =  1) means  .179 
Uncontrolled  subsample  (DLU  =  0) means  .381 
SQFT  =  1,800, BATH  =  2, POOL  =  1, VIEW  =  1, 
PTAX  =  5, TRANS  =  38, AGE  =  20, FRPLC  =  1, 
TEXP  =  235, DENSITY  =  3,500,  EBAY  =  1  .228 
SQFT  =  1,400, BATH  =  1.5, POOL  =  0, VIEW  =  0, 
PTAX  =  5, TRANS  =  38, AGE  =  25, FRPLC  =  0, 
TEXP  =  235, DENSITY  =  3,500,  EBAY  =  1  .260 
NOTE.-The  predicted  differentials  are based on the estimates  in cols. 2 and 3 of Table  3. 
from the single-equation  approach.  The differential  associated with for- 
mal growth  controls appears  to vary from  about 17  to 38 percent  of house 
price, depending  on structural,  neighborhood,  and local fiscal  characteris- 
tics. 
More than one interpretation  of the above data can explain the esti- 
mated differences between the house price equations  for the controlled 
and uncontrolled  subsamples.  The first  potential  explanation  is that these 
differentials  are "real" in the sense that "observationally  equivalent" 
houses will have systematically different prices depending  on whether 
their communities  are growth controlled or uncontrolled.  This perspec- 
tive leads to the conclusion that the estimated  positive price differentials 
for growth-controlled  communities  reflect  the supply-restriction  and mar- 
ket-reorientation  effects of growth-management  policies. If this interpre- 
tation  is correct, then growth  controls  appear  to have resulted  in substan- 
tial house price increases in those communities  in the San Francisco  Bay 
Area where they have been utilized for significant  periods of time. 
Another  possible interpretation  of the results  is that  these differences  in 
house prices could possibly be the "illusory"  outcome  of weakness in the 
statistical  technique resulting  from omitted variables, sample selectivity 
problems,  or both.11  The positive price differential  for houses in growth- 
1l Heckman  discusses  empirical techniques  for handling dummy endogenous  variables 
and sample selection  bias problems. James J. Heckman, Dummy Endogenous Variables in a 
Simultaneous Equation System,  46 Econometrica  931 (1978); and James J. Heckman,  Sam- 
ple Selection  Bias as Specification Error, 47 Econometrica  153 (1979). Freeman and Medoff 
argue that these  techniques  often fail to yield useful results because  they require exclusion 
and functional form/distribution restrictions for identification of which we lack the requisite 
knowledge.  Richard B. Freeman & James L. Medoff, The Impact of Collective  Bargaining: 
Illusion  or  Reality?  in  U.S.  Industrial  Relations,  1950-1980:  A  Critical Assessment  (J. 
Steiber, R. McKersie,  & D.  A.  Mills eds.,  IRRA 1981). 
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controlled  jurisdictions  may  reflect  structural or  neighborhood  quality 
characteristics  (not  included  in the  model)  that are correlated  with the 
presence of formal growth controls. This is possible but not likely because 
the addition of extra quality controls  as well  as other characteristics  on 
the  subsample  for  which  additional  information  was  available  did not 
tangibly alter the strength or direction of the results. 
A  reasonable  interpretation  of  our  results  is  that  formal  growth- 
management plans appear to have  an important interjurisdictional price 
effect  associated  with growth controls. 
IV.  CONCLUSION  AND SUMMARY 
This paper has shown,  through a careful empirical test based on a large 
data set on housing in the San Francisco  Bay Area, that land-use regula- 
tions appear to have had a substantial effect on house prices.  Our regres- 
sion analysis  indicates  that house  prices  are between  17 percent and 38 
percent  higher in those  communities  in which  growth moratoria and/or 
growth control plans are present. 
Our results  are not surprising given the widespread  use of controls  in 
many communities  that limit the available supply response in neighboring 
communities.  The spread of these  regulatory techniques  to metropolitan 
areas outside  of California may have  substantial negative  effects  on the 
affordability of housing for the maturing post-World  War II baby-boom 
cohort now entering the housing market. 
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